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Abstract—Key generation from wireless channels is a promis-
ing alternative to public key cryptography for the establishment
of cryptographic keys. It is the first paper to experimentally
study the channel reciprocity principle of key generation, through
investigating and quantifying channel measurements’ cross-
correlation relationship affected by noise and non-simultaneous
measurements. Channel measurements, both received signal
strength and channel state information, are collected from a real
experimental platform using the wireless open access research
platform (WARP) in a multipath office room. We found that in a
slow fading channel (e.g., with a coherence time of about 50 ms),
the channel cross-correlation is impacted greatly by noise but
little by non-simultaneous measurements with a small sampling
time difference (e.g., 0.06 ms). The resolution of the sampling
time difference can be satisfied by wireless systems such as IEEE
802.11 to maintain an acceptable cross-correlation coefficient
without affecting the bandwidth and communication efficiency.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, key generation, channel
reciprocity
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to its broadcast nature, wireless communication is vul-
nerable and thus protected by cryptographic schemes. These
schemes normally require keys securely shared before trans-
mission, which is usually carried out by public key cryptog-
raphy (PKC), e.g., Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [1].
PKC relies on computational hardness and requires a public
key infrastructure, which makes it unsuitable for low cost and
computation-restricted devices and ad hoc networks.
Key generation from the randomness of wireless fading
channels is a promising alternative and has received extensive
research attention [2], because this technique is information-
theoretically secure, lightweight and does not require any help
from other users. There have been key generation systems
reported by exploiting the randomness from received signal
strength (RSS) and channel state information (CSI), which
are available in commercial and customized hardware devices.
CSI-based key generation has been applied in IEEE 802.11 g/n
systems [3]–[5], while RSS has been used for key generation
in IEEE 802.11 systems [6], [7], IEEE 802.15.4 systems [8]–
[10] and Bluetooth systems [11].
Channel reciprocity principle indicates that the statistical
features at each end of a wireless link are the same, which is
the basis of the key generation. In practice, most of the com-
mercial wireless devices work in half-duplex mode. Therefore,
the legitimate users, Alice and Bob, measure the channel at
the same frequency alternately at different time instants, i.e.,
key generation usually works in a time-duplex division (TDD)
system and slow fading channel. In addition, hardware noises
are independent and cannot be avoided. Therefore, the received
signals at each node are not ideally symmetric due to the non-
simultaneous measurements and noises. After Alice and Bob
gather enough data, they quantize their asymmetric channel
measurements into binary values separately, which will not
always match. The disagreement of the quantized bits can then
be corrected by information reconciliation stage, e.g., by using
error correcting code [12], after which Alice and Bob will get
the same key.
The similarity of two signals can be quantified by cross-
correlation coefficient between them. So far, attempts to im-
prove cross-correlation of the measurements can be largely
sorted into two categories: interpolation [8], [9] and filter-
ing [3], [10], [13], [14]. Interpolation emulates that the channel
were measured at the same time while a filter can be employed
to suppress the high frequency components of the noise.
We have theoretically modelled and analyzed the effects
of non-simultaneous measurements and noise on the cross-
correlation of the measurements in [15], and found that noise
has a more dominant impact in a slow fading channel. In this
paper, we carried out an experimental study. We implemented a
key generation system using a customized hardware platform,
wireless open access research platform (WARP) [16] and
carried out an experiment to collect the real measurements
data, i.e., both RSS and CSI. We connected two boards to a
common antenna using a power splitter so that signals can
be received simultaneously by them but affected separately
by independent hardware noise. This arrangement enables
us to investigate the effect of noise without the impact of
non-simultaneous sampling and to quantify their contribution
to the signal cross-correlation. Results have revealed that
when the sampling time difference is small (e.g., 0.06 ms),
noise is the main factor that influences the cross-correlation
relationship of the measurements in a slow fading channel
(e.g., with coherence time as about 50 ms), which matches
our theoretical analysis in [15]. We also found the resolution
of the sampling time difference can be satisfied by wireless
systems such as IEEE 802.11 to maintain an acceptable cross-
correlation coefficient without affecting the bandwidth and
communication efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the channel model and Section III presents our
measurement system and test scenario. The evaluation metrics
are described in Section IV and the experiment results are
given in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
An experimental scenario is set up where Bob and Eve are
connected to a common antenna via a balanced power splitter,
as shown in Fig. 1(a). Alice, located several meters away from
them, sends signals every Ts ms and the signal received by
the common antenna of Bob and Eve is divided through the
power splitter and routed to Bob and Eve simultaneously at
time tB . After Bob successfully receives the signal, he returns
a signal to Alice which is also divided but at time tA. All
the signals are transmitted with the same power. The received
signals of Alice, Bob, and Eve can be given respectively as
yA(tA) =
√
G1sh(tA, τ) ∗ x(tA) + nA(tA), (1)
yB(tB) =
√
Gs1h(tB , τ) ∗ x(tB) + nB(tB), (2)
yE(tB) =
√
Gs2h(tB , τ) ∗ x(tB) + nE(tB), (3)
where ∗ denotes the convolution, h(t, τ) is the channel impulse
response (CIR), nu(t) is user u’s hardware noise, u represents
A, B or E, and Gij is the transmission coefficient between
ports i and j of the power splitter. In this way, the signal is
received by Bob and Eve simultaneously and later affected
by hardware noise independently. Therefore, the effect of the
non-simultaneous measurements and noise on the correlation
relationship can be separately evaluated.
The received powers of the users can be written as
PA(tA) = G1sP (tA) + P
n
A(tA), (4)
PB(tB) = Gs1P (tB) + P
n
B(tB), (5)
PE(tB) = Gs2P (tB) + P
n
E(tB), (6)
where P (t) is the power of the signal h(t, τ)∗x(t) and Pnu (t)
is the power of noise residing in user u. The received power
is usually reported as RSS in network interface cards (NICs).
In orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) sys-
tems, CSI can be estimated by training symbols, which is given
as
ĤA(tA, fm) =
√
G1sH(tA, fm) + ŵA(tA, fm), (7)
ĤB(tB , fm) =
√
Gs1H(tB , fm) + ŵB(tB , fm), (8)
ĤE(tB , fm) =
√
Gs2H(tB , fm) + ŵE(tB , fm), (9)
where H(t, fm) and ŵu(t, fm) are the frequency domain
counterparts of h(t, τ) and nu(t), respectively.
Both the received power and CSI contain channel random-
ness and can be exploited for key generation.
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III. MEASUREMENT SYSTEM AND TEST SCENARIO
A measurement system is designed using WARP [16], a
scalable and extensible wireless platform. The WARP 802.11
reference design is a real-time FPGA implementation of IEEE
802.11 distributed coordination function (DCF) MAC and
OFDM physical (PHY) protocol. The physical packet structure
is shown in Fig. 2. WARP boards and a PC are connected by a
1 Gbps Ethernet switch. The transmission information, such as
timestamp, received power, and channel estimation, etc., can
be stored in the PC for off-line processing.
According to the DCF MAC protocol, the receiver will send
an ACKnowledgement (ACK) packet back to the transmitter
upon the successful reception of the data packet after waiting a
short interframe space (SIFS), as illustrated in Fig. 3. Both the
data and ACK packet are modulated by OFDM, so the users
can estimate the channel using the long training symbol (LTS)
in the preamble of the physical packet. The time difference
between the data packet and corresponding ACK packet can
be calculated as
∆tAB = tdata + tSIFS
= (5 + d 8ldata + 22
NsubcNbpscR
e)80
B
+ tSIFS, (10)
where ldata is the byte number of MAC payload, Nsubc is
the number of data subcarriers, Nbpsc is the number of bits
modulated to each subcarrier, R is the convolutional coding
rate, B is the channel spacing, and tSIFS is the time of the
SIFS. In a B = 20 MHz channel spacing IEEE 802.11
system, Nsubc = 48, tSIFS = 16 µs, R = {1/2, 2/3, 3/4},
and Nbpsc = {1, 2, 4, 6}. The MAC fragmentation threshold
is 2346 bytes [17], i.e., 28 ≤ ldata ≤ 2346. The range of time
difference can be calculated as
0.044 ms ≤ ∆tAB ≤ 3.168 ms. (11)
As shown in Fig. 1(b), Bob and Eve were connected to
the common antenna using a power splitter with a model of
ZFRSC-42+ [18]. The power splitter can operate from DC
to 4.2 GHz. It is specified in the manual that for 2.4 GHz
operation, Gs1 = −6.03 dB, Gs2 = −6.01 dB and G1s =
−5.95 dB, whose values are almost the same. We also mea-
sured these transmission coefficients using a vector network
analyzer, and the results are G′s1 = G
′
s2 = G
′
1s = −5.95 dB,
which match the specification.
All the users were running WARP 802.11 reference design
and operating at fc = 2.412 GHz center frequency. Alice and
Bob were configured as an access point (AP) and a station
(STA), respectively, while Eve was set as a passive listener.
All the users were running at a data rate of 18 Mbps (R = 3/4,
Nbpsc = 2) with a ldata = 48 bytes data payload. Under
this configuration, ∆tAB = 0.06 ms. Alice was broadcasting
Beacons every 100 ms to keep all the users synchronized.
Alice was also sending data packets every Ts = 0.96 ms1,
whose power was divided by the power splitter evenly and
received by Bob and Eve. The timing between the users’
received packets is illustrated in Fig. 3.
The experiment was carried out in an office room with
desks, chairs and cupboards, etc, which was considered to
represent a typical multipath indoor environment. Alice was
put on a trolley and moving at a speed of v = 1 m/s while Bob
and Eve remained stationary. The experiment lasted 60 s and
all the users recorded about 60,000 packets, which is enough
for the numerical calculation of the correlation coefficient.
The channel was dynamic due to the movement of Alice.
The coherence time is the time duration over which the
channel stays unchanged and can be estimated as [19]
Tc =
0.423
fd
=
0.423c
vfc
= 52.6 ms, (12)
where fd is the Doppler spread, c is the speed of light.
1The WARP 802.11 reference design requires a transmission resolution of
64 µs.
IV. EVALUATION METRICS
The signal similarity can be quantified by the cross-
correlation coefficient, which is defined as
ρXuv =
E{Xu(t)Xv(t)} − E{Xu(t)}E{Xv(t)}
σXuσXv
, (13)
where E{·} represents expectation operator, σX is the stan-
dard deviation of the signal X , and Xu(t) denotes Pu(t) or
|Ĥu(t, fm)|, | · | denotes the amplitude.
The channel measurements Xu(t) can be quantized into
binary values. Mean value-based quantization [7] is used as
an example, which is given as
KXu (i) =
{
1, Xu(tu(i)) > µu; (14a)
0, Xu(tu(i)) ≤ µu, (14b)
where µu = E{Xu(tu)}. Key disagreement rate (KDR) can
then be calculated by comparing the keys generated by users,
which is defined as
KDRXuv =
∑N
i=1 |KXu (i)−KXv (i)|
N
. (15)
The KDR is an essential parameter in key generation and
determines the design of the information reconciliation stage.
It is noted that ρXAB and KDR
X
AB are influenced by both non-
simultaneous measurements and noise while ρXBE and KDR
X
BE
are only affected by noise because XB(t) and XE(t) have the
same sampling time. Therefore, the effect of non-simultaneous
measurements and noise can be separately analyzed.
The average correlation coefficient and KDR of CSI are
calculated by averaging across all the subcarriers, given as
ρ¯|Ĥ|uv =
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
ρ|Ĥ(fm)|uv , (16)
and
KDR
|Ĥ|
uv =
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
KDR|Ĥ(fm)|uv , (17)
respectively, where M is the subcarrier’s number of training
symbols and M = 52 in IEEE 802.11 OFDM system.
V. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
The received powers of Alice, Bob, and Eve in the first 10 s
are shown in Fig. 4. The average absolute difference between
these powers can be calculated as
µ|P |uv = E{|Pu(t)− Pv(t)|}. (18)
When the sampling time difference ∆tAB = 0.06 ms, µ
|P |
AB =
1.207 dBm and µ|P |BE = 2.269 dBm, which is quite small
compared with the power variation and indicates a high
consistence between each other. The correlation and KDR
between the powers are calculated and shown in Fig. 5. It can
be observed when ∆tAB = 0.06 ms, ρPAB and ρ
P
BE are almost
equal, and KDRPAB is very close to KDR
P
BE.
CSI of the first subcarrier of Alice, Bob and Eve in the first
10 s are shown as examples in Fig. 6. The correlation coef-
ficients and KDRs between the subcarriers can be calculated
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and shown in Fig. 7, which indicates that these correlation
coefficients and KDRs match when ∆tAB = 0.06 ms.
Noise impacts on the cross-correlation and KDRs. As shown
in Fig. 5 and Fig. 7, when Bob and Eve measure the channel
simultaneously, ρPBE = 0.96 and ρ
|Ĥ(fm)|
BE is around 0.8. It
can also be observed that ρPuv > ρ
|Ĥ(fm)|
uv , i.e., noise is more
detrimental to CSI. This is because received power is averaged
over one packet and some of the noise effect is canceled out.
Further analyses are carried out by increasing the sampling
time difference, which is achieved by changing the pairing
between the records of data packets di at Bob and Eve and
records of ACK packets Aj at Alice, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
The time difference ∆t′AB can be calculated as
∆t′AB = 0.06 + (j − i)× 0.96 ms. (19)
The correlation coefficients and KDRs of the received powers
and CSI changes against sampling time difference ∆t′AB are
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|Ĥ(fm)|
BE
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
Subcarrier Index, m
KD
R
 
 
KDR
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∆tAB = 0.06 ms.
shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 8, respectively. As can be observed
from the figures, both ρPAB and ρ¯
|Ĥ|
AB vary with ∆t
′
AB. In a slow
fading channel such as Alice moving at a speed of 1 m/s and
the coherence time is about 52.6 ms in this example, when
increasing ∆t′AB from 0.06 ms to 7.7 ms, ρ
P
AB drops from 0.96
to 0.92 while ρ¯|Ĥ|AB only decreases by less than 0.02; KDR
P
AB
increases from 0.09 to 0.12 while KDR
|Ĥ|
AB only increases by
less than 0.01. However, when ∆t′AB is close to coherence
time (i.e., 50.4 ms), ρPAB and ρ¯
|Ĥ|
AB decrease by 0.36 and 0.17,
respectively, which is quite significant. The acceptable ∆t′AB
is upper bounded as the key disagreement should be later
corrected by information reconciliation. For example, a secure
sketch scheme designed with BCH code [n, k, t] can correct
up to t/n disagreement [12], [14].
IEEE 802.11 OFDM systems use the LTS to estimate the
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channel and gets the received power by averaging over the
entire packet, which is irrelevant of the content and length of
the data payload. Even when the system reaches ∆tAB,max =
3.168 ms with maximum data payload, ρPAB and ρ¯
|Ĥ|
AB only
decrease by less than 0.02 and 0.005, respectively, compared
to the values measured at ∆tAB = 0.06 ms. This is beneficial
as the key generation can be carried out by using routine
data transmission rather than dedicated communication. The
channel capacity and bandwidth of the communication system
is not affected by the key generation.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is the first paper that experimentally studies the effect
of non-simultaneous measurements and noise on the cross-
correlation and KDR of the channel measurements in a slow
fading channel. We implemented a testbed using WARP boards
which are compatible with IEEE 802.11 DCF MAC and
OFDM PHY protocol and can thereof provide both RSS and
CSI. We connected two boards to a common antenna using
a power splitter, allowing the received signals to be mea-
sured at the same time but affected by independent hardware
noise separately. Through the analysis of cross-correlation
coefficient and KDR calculated from the experiment data, we
found that when the sampling time difference is small (e.g.,
0.06 ms), channel correlation is more sensitive to noise in
a slow fading channel (e.g., with coherence time as about
50 ms). We also found that the sampling time difference
in routine communication can obtain an acceptable cross-
correlation coefficient, which does not affect the bandwidth
and communication efficiency. Our next step will be design-
ing signal pre-processing algorithms to improve the cross-
correlation relationship and decrease the KDR between the
channel measurements at each keying node.
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